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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
Nos. 16-3529 and 18-3811
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALLIE SPEIGHT,
a/k/a Allie Speights
a/k/a A.H. Speight
Allie Speight,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-0641-001)
District Judge: Hon. Juan R. Sánchez
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 13, 2021
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
(Filed April 28, 2021)
_______________
OPINION
_______________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Allie Speight pled guilty to crimes related to an eight-year-long fraudulent scheme
in which he directed co-conspirators to obtain mortgage loans in others’ names and steal
the proceeds. On appeal, he challenges his sentence and his underlying conviction. We
will affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND
Speight was indicted for multiple fraud offenses in 2010, including conspiracy to

commit money laundering by wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)
and (a)(1)(B)(i). He sought to represent himself, and the District Court conducted a
colloquy before concluding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel. The Court permitted him to proceed pro se, with his court-appointed attorney
acting as standby counsel. On April 5, 2012, he pled guilty to ten charges.
The District Court held Speight’s first sentencing hearing in 2013, during which
Speight was represented by an appointed attorney. The government introduced evidence
of actual loss through the testimony of an FBI agent, who described the mortgage
amounts and sale records or estimated market values for the fourteen properties targeted
in the fraudulent mortgage scheme. The FBI agent calculated a loss of approximately
$2.04 million, subtracting recovered amounts from the original loans fraudulently
obtained by Speight and his co-conspirators. Speight’s attorney objected to the
calculated loss amount. He also objected to the presentence report’s recommendation of
a two-level sentencing enhancement for ten or more victims, a four-level sentencing
enhancement for a leadership role, a two-level enhancement for a crime involving
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sophisticated means, and a two-level sentencing enhancement for money laundering. The
Court overruled each objection.
Arguing for a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Speight’s attorney
referenced findings from a court-ordered psychological evaluation that concluded Speight
suffers from anti-social personality disorder. The Court declined to vary from the
guidelines range. It sentenced Speight to 160 months’ imprisonment, and included
mental health treatment as a condition of supervised release. Speight appealed, arguing
that the Court erred in not sua sponte ordering a competency evaluation at the time he
pled guilty. United States v. Speight, 554 F. App’x 119, 122 (3d Cir. 2014). We affirmed
the conviction and sentence. Id.
In July 2013, the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned Speight’s prior state
conviction, on which the criminal history category was based when his sentencing range
in this case was calculated. Speight then successfully moved to vacate his sentence in
this matter.
In 2016, the District Court resentenced him. It incorporated the evidence of actual
loss from the 2013 Sentencing but reduced the estimate to $1,961,116 to account for the
actual sale price, rather than the estimated market value, of one since-sold property.
Speight’s new attorney objected to the same sentencing enhancements, which the Court
again overruled, incorporating its rulings from the 2013 Sentencing. Due to Speight’s
reduced criminal history category, the Court sentenced him to 146 months’
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imprisonment, five years’ supervised release with special conditions of drug treatment
and mental health programs, and $1,961,116 in restitution. Speight has again appealed.1
II.

DISCUSSION2
Speight challenges his sentence and conviction, and once more his arguments fail.
A.

The District Court did not clearly err in determining the guidelines loss
attributable to Speight.

We review the District Court’s loss findings for clear error.3 United States v.
Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2009). The amount of loss attributed to a defendant
convicted of a fraud conspiracy largely dictates his guidelines offense level. U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(1). A loss of more than $1.5 million but and not more than $3.5 million
results in a 16-level enhancement, as found by the District Court here. Id. (b)(1)(I).
“[A]ctual loss” is “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the
offense.” Id. cmt. n.3(A)(i). Loss is based on “relevant conduct[,]” which includes “all
acts and omissions committed, aided, [or] abetted ... by the defendant[,]” and “in the case
of a jointly undertaken criminal activity ... all acts and omissions of others that were ...

Speight separately appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion seeking
production of a second transcript. He baselessly argues that the transcript that has been
produced was tampered with. We consolidated the appeal regarding the transcript with
this resentencing appeal.
1

2

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
The government contends that we should review Speight’s challenge to the
evidentiary basis for calculating loss for plain error because he failed to object on that
basis at sentencing. United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 2007). We need
not resolve that issue because Speight’s argument fails under either standard of review.
3
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reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity[.]” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)(B). The sentencing court “need only make a reasonable estimate of loss[.]” Id.
§ 2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3(C).
Speight first argues that no “reliable and specific” evidence in the record supports
the loss estimate. (Opening Br. 9-11.) We disagree. The District Court relied on the FBI
agent’s extensive review of mortgage and sale records to determine actual loss. No error
occurred because that evidence provided a reasonable estimate of actual loss.
Speight also contends that he should not have been held responsible for the entire
loss amount, as the losses caused by his co-conspirators were not reasonably foreseeable.
Speight’s specific admissions at his plea hearing that he directed others to further the
fraudulent scheme belie that argument.4 The District Court did not clearly err.
B.

The District Court did not clearly err in applying the other sentencing
enhancements.

We review for clear error the District Court’s factual findings related to a
guidelines calculation. United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 308 (3d Cir. 2007).
Speight says that the District Court erred in applying a four-level enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his role as a leader or organizer of a conspiracy involving
five or more participants. But the evidence in the record supports the finding that Speight
led a conspiracy consisting of five or more participants: Speight admitted at his guilty
plea to a leadership role and the presentence report and change-of-plea colloquy describe
at least five other participants, three of whom were prosecuted.

4

For those reasons, Speight’s challenge to the restitution amount also fails.
5

Next, he argues that the District Court erred in applying a two-level enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) for an offense including ten or more victims. A
“victim” is defined as “any person [or entity] who sustained any part of the actual loss[.]”
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. The testifying FBI agent identified ten victim financial
institutions and the amount each institution loaned. Speight’s argument is therefore
without merit.
Speight also contends that the District Court erroneously applied a two-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) for committing a money laundering
offense in conjunction with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956. He argues that he falls under
Note 3(C) of the guideline, which exempts defendants who are “convicted of a
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and the sole object of that conspiracy was to
commit an offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1957.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) cmt.
n.3(C). Speight’s argument fails because the indictment charges him with conspiring
under § 1956(h) to violate § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i)—not § 1957—and he
admitted to the indicted offense when he pled guilty.
Again, there was no clear error in the District Court’s decisions on those
guidelines issues.
C.

The District Court did not plainly err in ordering mental health
treatment as a special condition of supervised release.

We typically review a district court’s imposition of a special condition of
supervised release for abuse of discretion, but absent an objection, we review for plain
error. United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). The special condition
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must be “reasonably related” to statutory sentencing factors and involve no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve sentencing purposes. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), (2). Because Speight himself raised questions about his mental
health during the criminal proceedings, the District Court did not err, much less plainly
err, in finding that mental health treatment was reasonably related to statutory sentencing
factors.
D.

We will not consider Speight’s claim that his guilty plea was invalid.

Finally, Speight argues that the District Court violated his right to counsel and that
his uncounseled guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Those arguments lack merit,
and because they were not raised in the initial direct appeal of his conviction, see Speight,
554 F. App’x at 119-23, they are forfeited. United States v. Pultrone, 241 F.3d 306, 30708 (3d Cir. 2001) (declining to revisit, on appeal of a remand for resentencing only,
arguments disputing the defendant’s conviction which were not preserved on direct
appeal).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

7

